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  Dr. Israel Eldad

Principles for a Hebrew Liberation Movement
by Dr. Eldad

Transcripts of Dr. Israel Eldad on IDF Radio

Excerpts from Dr. Israel Eldad's Op-Ed Column

Collection from Zote Ha'aretz
by Dr. Eldad

Memorial for Fighters for the Freedom of Israel
by Dr. Eldad

What We Need Is A King
by Dr. Eldad


You Should Be Ashamed!
by Dr. Eldad

Jabotinsky Distorted
by Dr. Eldad

The Fifth of Iyar
by Dr. Eldad


Temple Mount in Ruins
by Dr. Eldad

Jerusalem: The City of Faith
by Dr. Eldad

The Challenge of Jerusalem
by Dr. Eldad

Between Giving the Torah and Receiving It
by Dr. Eldad

The Jewish Defense League of Shushan Habira
by Dr. Eldad

An Open and Distressed Letter to Menachem Begin
by Dr. Eldad

Elnakam: Story of a Fighter for the Freedom of Israel
by Dr. Eldad

The Israel Restraint Forces
by Dr. Eldad

The Real-Politik of Our Sages
by Dr. Eldad

Jerusalem: A Burning Issue Trial of Faith
by Dr. Eldad

A New Type of Jew
by Dr. Eldad

Foundation Stones
by Dr. Eldad

Dr. Eldad & the Supreme Court of Israel
Selected Judgments

Biography: Dr. Israel Eldad
by Chaim Yerushalmi


BIBLICAL COMMENTARIES
   

Dr. Eldad and the Supreme Court of Israel

This then is the background which led to the issue of the order nisi against the second respondent (though not against the other respondent, to whom only copies of the papers were sent by order of the court). With this background in mind, and in the light of the facts which I have already cited together with some other facts which will be mentioned later, the court must now decide upon the application of the petitioner.

3.    The nature of the petitioner’s complaint - as was emphasised by his counsel at the beginning of his argument - is that the petitioner is being persecuted because of his personal opinions and his political activity. I take the liberty of expressing on this occasion and from this Bench my wish and my hope which, I am sure, are shared by thousands of the citizens of this State, that it will not be long before the Knesset passes a Law imposing a strict prohibition on teachers and educators and all those who are concerned with education, in theory or in practice, from indulging openly or secretly, and whether within a school or outside school, in politics, or in any form of occupation which has a political flavour. The education of our children is a sacred task which may not be sullied by alien influences. Those who engage in politics and those who engage in education must remain within their own respective domains and one should not trespass on the field of the other. And if a teacher and educator wishes to enter the cauldron of politics, let him cast aside the teacher’s robe. and engage in politics to his heart’s content. But let him not enter a school again, and poison the minds of his pupils with the violence of politics and party differences. To our regret, however, no such Law has yet been placed upon the statute book of our State, so all who wish to combine teaching and politics may do so and no one can stand in their way. Since this is so, the one may not be prevented from doing what the other is permitted to do; and a teacher - or one who is preparing himself to be a teacher - is not to be disqualified merely because of his political opinions or activity.

4.    It was said that no complaint can be made against the second respondent for two reasons : first, that the third respondent, the Principal of the school, and the petitioner both made the acceptance of the petitioner as a teacher in the school conditional upon the securing of the prior confirmation of a third person - in this case the second respondent - and if that third person refuse to give the required confirmation, what recourse can the petitioner have against him? Will the court compel him to confirm the appointment just in order to give effect to the contractual relationship between the parties to the agreement - he himself being a stranger to them arid they being strangers to him? It was argued in the second place that when the second respondent was asked his opinion about the petitioner, he was under no “legal duty . . . to give the Reali Montefiore School . . . a dishonest reply”. The meaning of these words - which are quoted from the affidavit of the second respondent - as I understand them, is this : the second respondent had made up his mind to oppose the employment of the petitioner as a teacher, but the law imposed on him no obligation to reply to the question of the Principal of the Montefiore School as to the reasons for his objection to such employment, and since that is so the court will not order him to give such a reply contrary to his opinion and his conscience.

5.    These reasons appear to be two, but are in fact only one. I, for my part, would incline to accept them as sound and decide against the petitioner had the third respondent in fact acted on his own initiative and opinion and if without any pressure from outside he had approached the second respondent and asked his opinion of the petitioner. Had this been the case I would have said that he sought good advice from the second respondent and the confirmation of a man who was an expert. The approach of the third respondent to the second respondent, however, was not a mere chance approach, nor was it made for the purpose of seeking advice - it was made in consequence of something which had happened beforehand. What had taken place was as follows : on June 13, 1950, the second respondent - as appears from his own affidavit - had addressed a circular to the directors of secondary schools in the country in which he requested them not to employ teachers in their schools without the consent of the Government Inspector of Secondary Schools. This Inspector is the assistant and principal aide of the second respondent. The legal effect of this circular, and the manner in which the third respondent was obliged or able to perform his own duties - had he wished to do so - in the light of its provisions, are questions with which we shall deal later. At this stage, and for the purpose of the twofold argument to which I have referred, it is sufficient to point out that a condition which a man lays down himself has not the same effect as a condition which he lays down upon the orders or suggestions of a higher authority. In the first case he will express his own untrammelled will, while in the second case he will give effect to the wishes of his superiors. From this point of view, considerable interest attaches to the letter of the inspector of Secondary Schools to the third respondent, and the third respondent’s letter to the petitioner, for these two letters are apt to throw a good deal of light on the internal relationship between the schools - even private schools - and the Department of Education and those who stand at its head, as well as upon the nature of the condition laid down in the agreement between the third respondent and the petitioner. It should be noted that the Inspector does not say in his letter that the second respondent - in accordance with his own opinion or upon the advice of the Ministry of Defence - is not prepared to confirm the contract between the third respondent and the petitioner, but expresses specific and clear objection to the employment of the petitioner. The letter does not merely express an absence of a friendly attitude to the petitioner, but takes up a definitely hostile attitude. And how did the third respondent understand the attitude of the second respondent? The Principal does not write, in his letter to the petitioner, that the contract is cancelled because of non-receipt of confirmation or words to that effect, but that in accordance with the letter of the Department of Education the petitioner may not be accepted as a teacher. In short, what was designed - as has been submitted to us - to be just good advice, became opposition; the opposition became a serious prohibition; and it was this prohibition, real or assumed - which led to the suspension, or, to put it more accurately, to the non-acceptance of the petitioner as a teacher. The non-fulfilment of the contract between the petitioner and the third respondent was not, therefore, the fruit of the third respondent’s free choice, but the product of compulsion which was imposed upon them by a person - a public official - upon whom depended the fulfilment or non- fulfilment of the condition referred to. It cannot be said, moreover, as was submitted before us, that this person expressed only his own opinion, and since the law imposes no duty upon him, he cannot be compelled to pervert his opinion, and the petitioner, therefore, has no recourse against him.

6. It was also submitted that the second respondent acted according to law, and that the court will therefore not interfere. The justification of his action is expressed by the second respondent in his affidavit as follows:

    “In view of the finding of the Minister of Defence and his Ministry - who are responsible for matters to the defence of the State - that the petitioner is not suitable to be a teacher, I, as the person responsible for the educational organisation in the State am obliged to do everything I can to prevent the petitioner from being accepted as a teacher in the Reali Montefiore School or in any other school in the State.”

    From this language we draw conclusions : first, that it was the Minister of Defence and his Ministry who disqualified the petitioner from being a teacher in the schools of the country; secondly, that the second respondent regarded the decision of disqualification referred to as a decision binding upon him. It seems to me, however, with all respect to the second respondent, that even if we assume that the matter in question falls within the scope of his authority - a question to which we shall return hater - we are confronted here with a confusion of issues and an overstepping of jurisdiction on the part of certain government authorities.

   
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